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Richards, E., and B. O’Brien. Misreading Scripture with Western Eyes. Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2012. 220 pp. Paper, $16.00.
The authors of  this book are apparently student and teacher, both from a 
conservative, evangelical background. Thus the book offers reflection on 
practice.
When I was part of  the pastoral team in a large multicultural church in 
the Washington, DC, area, we pastors envied pastors of  (presumably) all-
White “First churches” down the road from us. This book is written for those 
churches making the transition from mono-cultural to multi-cultural. And 
since multicultural congregations are increasingly the norm, this book will 
be helpful to Christians worshiping in multicultural settings and to pastors 
of  these congregations. It will also be useful to those leading out in home 
missions and short-term mission trips.
Beginning with easier topics, such as race and language, it progresses 
to more difficult topics: individualism, shame/honor, time, and the self-
centeredness of  North American (church) culture.
In all, this volume will help Westerners take a studied look at themselves 
and how they read the Bible, in helpful contrast to the intentions of  the 
writers.
Each chapter ends with a list of  “Points to Ponder,” which will guide 
conversations and study groups. The last (unnumbered) chapter offers the 
reader five recommendations to becoming a multicultural congregation.
Berrien Springs, Michigan              brucE campbEll moyEr
Stump, Eleonore. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of  Suffering. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. xix + 668 pp. Hardcover, $110.
Eleonore Stump says she has wanted to write this book all her adult life 
(vi). It brings to fruition years of  reflection on the topic and incorporates 
material from various series of  lectures, including the Gifford Lectures 
of  2003, with which it shares its title. In view of  its sweeping scope and 
meticulous construction, Wandering in Darkness certainly rates as one of  the 
most important books on the topic to appear in recent years. 
“Wandering” may aptly describe the experience of  suffering, but it hardly 
applies to this discussion. Like an experienced guide, Stump takes her readers 
on a well-planned itinerary at a deliberate pace. She tells us just where we are 
going at the outset, reminds us of  our destination at regular intervals, and 
carefully explains what everything she directs attention to contributes to our 
progress. 
On the other hand, the word “problem” correctly identifies the 
philosophical objective of  the book. Its overarching purpose is to provide an 
effective response to the problem of  evil, the challenge that suffering poses to 
the credibility of  theism. Invoking a familiar philosophical distinction, Stump 
repeatedly asserts that her objective is to provide a defense, not a theodicy. In 
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contrast to a theodicy, which seeks to provide morally sufficient reasons for 
God to allow suffering in this world, a defense seeks only to describe a possible 
world that contains both God and suffering. And whereas the claims of  a 
successful theodicy must be true, it is sufficient for an adequate defense if  its 
claims may be true (19, 155, 377, 389). 
Stump is also specific as to the sort of  suffering she has in mind. Suffering 
comes in many forms, from animal pain to genocide, but her concern here 
is not the suffering of  sentient beings in general, but only the suffering of  
“mentally fully functional human beings” (4, 378). 
To construct the general framework of  her defense, Stump employs the 
thought of  Thomas Aquinas, in particular his view of  the human good (81). 
On Aquinas’s account, the ultimate proper object of  love is God; the ultimate 
good for any human person is shared union with God (95); and the ultimate 
end of  the love of  persons is “union with God shared in the union with other 
human beings” (91). Love can achieve its goal, however, only if  the one loved is 
undivided, and the perpetual obstacle to love in human experience is a “willed 
loneliness,” which results in a divided self. Neither God nor other human 
persons can enjoy union with someone who is alienated from herself  (156). 
God’s remedy for this universal post-Fall affliction, as Aquinas describes it, 
is a surrender to divine grace. Operative grace is active in divine justification; 
cooperative grace, in sanctification. Together, they bring about the moral and 
spiritual regeneration “which is requisite for internal integration, which is 
necessary for all love” (172). 
For Aquinas, suffering plays an integral role in this healing process. It is 
“God’s medicine for the psychic disorder of  post-Fall human beings.” And 
because suffering helps to “ward off  the worst things” that can happen to 
us—isolation from God—and “provide the best thing”—“glory in shared 
union with God” (398-401), there are “morally sufficient reasons” for God 
to allow it (396).
Helpful as Aquinas’s thought is in addressing the problem of  suffering, 
Stump says there are important facets of  the experience that he does not 
account for. Besides a loving union with God and others, human flourishing 
also requires something quite different, namely, “the desires of  the heart” 
(Ps 37:4-5), and suffering results when someone fails to get the desires of  
her heart or has and loses her heart’s desire (7). A successful defense must 
therefore envision a way for us to achieve the desires of  our hearts in a world 
where suffering interferes.
To do this, Stump argues, we must go beyond conventional analytic 
philosophy, with its preoccupation with knowledge. Since desires of  the 
heart are intensely personal, the suffering involved in losing them is intensely 
personal as well, and we can grasp its distinctive qualities only by looking 
at the experience of  individual, concrete sufferers. This is why narratives 
are essential to the sort of  defense that Stump has in mind.  Only narrative 
makes available second-person knowledge, or “Franciscan knowledge” (51), 
that is, intimate or shared knowledge of  another person’s experience. As the 
discovery of  mirror neurons demonstrates, human beings are capable of  
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sharing, indeed participating in, the experiences of  other persons (69-71); 
and personal stories, or narratives, are the means by which such knowledge 
becomes available. 
Stump considers the loss of  the heart’s desires in the biblical narratives 
of  four representative figures—Job, Abraham, Samson, and Mary of  Bethany. 
Taken together, she maintains, these four characters provide “an iconic 
representation of  the panoply of  human suffering,” in which all the modes 
of  suffering are present. In their stories we find the pain and agony of  the 
innocent victim, the evil of  self-destruction, the heartsickness of  losing what 
one loves the most, and the misery of  being unwanted and shamed (375). In 
their “messy richness,” these accounts “inform in subtle ways our intuition 
and judgments, just as real-life experiences do” (373). These stories do much 
more than illustrate abstract philosophical points. They provide direct insight 
into the actual experience of  suffering.
Not only do these four narratives reveal the distinctive qualities of  
individual sufferings, they also show that sufferers who are originally denied 
their heart’s desires may ultimately achieve these desires within a personal 
relationship with God. “[W]hen a person weaves her heart’s desires into 
a deepest desire for God,” Stump says, “it is possible for those desires to 
be transformed [. . .] so that even the worst external circumstances are not 
sufficient to prevent their being satisfied somehow in the union of  love with 
God” (473). What the sufferer thought he or she most wanted, and failed to 
realize, is ultimately gained  in “refolded” form within an intimate, second-
person, relationship with God. In a union with God, each sufferer does, in 
fact, find the desires of  his or her heart fulfilled. Remarkably, “the suffering 
that breaks the heart yields for the sufferer the desires of  her heart” (479).
Moreover, within this intimate relationship with God, mirabile dictu, not 
only does the sufferer achieve a new form of  what was lost, what he or she 
ultimately achieves seems to the sufferer “more worth having than what she 
originally hoped for” (473). Mary of  Bethany, for example, enjoys a reunion 
with her brother Lazarus that is richer than what she hoped for before Jesus 
raised him from the dead. What Samson gained in his relationship to God 
at the end of  his life was greater than everything he lost through betrayal 
and humiliation. And to cite a nonbiblical example, after the one thing John 
Milton desired more than all else, viz., the triumph of  the Puritan cause, was 
lost, he wrote the majestic poetry for which he is known. But in that poetry, 
which would not have come about had Puritanism succeeded, the movement 
he cherished achieved an expression that was arguably greater than what his 
original vision entailed (469). 
This concept of  the way in which the desires of  a person’s heart may 
ultimately be received returns us to the essential theme of  the Thomistic 
defense, and the integration of  these two components completes Stump’s 
response to the problem of  suffering. Recall that for Aquinas the supreme 
human good, the essential requirement for human flourishing, is union with 
God. With the realization that the desires of  the heart can ultimately be 
fulfilled in intimate relationship to God, we find a defense that addresses both 
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concerns. Within an intimate connection with God a person can realize both 
the fulfillment of  human flourishing and the achievement of  one’s heart’s 
desire. “When a person takes God as her deepest desire, what is highest on 
the scale of  objective value and what is deepest on the scale of  subjective 
value for her becomes the same for her.” This weaves into a unity all the 
things a person cares about, her flourishing and all her heart’s desires, which 
she now desires as gifts of  God (449). 
In sum, the Thomistic defense, when complemented by the insights 
contained in biblical narratives, provides an answer to “the central question” 
that suffering poses to religious belief ” (455). There are, indeed, morally 
sufficient reasons for God to allow suffering. 
By any standard, Wandering in Darkness is a remarkable achievement, well 
deserving of  the generous praise it has received. It presents the work of  a 
mature scholar addressing a fundamental philosophical question, drawing 
on a lifetime of  careful research, thoroughly conversant with all the relevant 
discussions of  the topic, as well as the various subtopics and secondary issues 
surrounding it. Moreover, the discussion is not merely informed, informative, 
and intellectually stimulating; it is personally moving. It obviously flows from 
the author’s profound investment in the issue, and it is virtually impossible 
not to be drawn into the sort of  personal concern that radiates from its pages. 
Impressive as it is, this proposal, as do all treatments of  suffering, leaves 
us with some lingering questions. One concerns the limited scope of  the 
suffering Stump addresses, given the extensive, not to say elaborate, nature 
of  her argument. Granted, one cannot do everything in a single book, as 
she says; but even though it is certainly worthwhile to address the suffering 
of  fully functioning adults, there are other forms of  suffering that pose 
enormous obstacles to theism. The suffering of  children and the horror of  
the Holocaust, for example, are frequently cited as the most obvious reasons 
to question God’s existence. One wonders how the defense Stump formulates 
would address such phenomena. 
Another concern involves the limited time frame that factors into Stump’s 
defense. In their well-known responses to the problems that suffering presents 
to theism, Marilyn McCord Adams and John Hick invoke the concept that 
human life will continue beyond death and that it is in the life to come that 
the negative effects of  suffering will ultimately be redeemed. Granted, Stump 
seems to hold out the possibility that this is where some will finally enjoy 
union with God (Job’s first ten children, for example), but the idea does not 
play a significant role in these reflections. Instead, the sufferings of  the four 
figures that receive her detailed attention—Job, Abraham, Samson, and Mary 
of  Bethany—all experienced an intimate union with God before their earthly 
lives ended. 
Then there is a question that seems to hover over every attempt to reduce 
suffering as an obstacle to belief  in God. Is the net effect of  suffering’s presence 
in the world ultimately positive or negative? Granted, Stump maintains that 
some good things are irrevocably lost in this life, and the hope provided by 
the stories she analyzes and the Thomistic defense she appeals to is “the 
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redemption of  evil, not its elimination” (479, cf. 256). But she also maintains 
that the sufferer will regard the benefits eventually acquired following the loss 
of  her heart’s desire “more worth having” than what she originally hoped for. 
If  so, we have to ask if  anything of  real significance is truly lost. If  the good 
things that eventually follow, and necessarily presuppose, suffering prevent 
us from regretting that it ever happened, one has to wonder if  its net effect 
is really negative. In spite of  Stump’s insistence that suffering is essentially 
negative and must be opposed and resisted, her defense leaves me with the 
impression that the potential gains that follow suffering outweigh the loss it 
involves. 
But this presents us with a dilemma that seems to attach to any defense 
or theodicy. The more we emphasize the negativity and horror of  suffering, 
the less effective our attempts to defuse its power will seem. Conversely, the 
more effective our responses to suffering become, the more we appear to 
minimize its negative character. Wandering in Darkness leaves me wondering 
if, in Stump’s scheme of  things, the particular benefits to which suffering 
can lead within one’s intimacy with God ultimately outweigh the pain of  the 
suffering itself. I see a similarity here to Marilyn McCord Adams’s view that 
horrendous evils will be ultimately defeated because their victims will come 
to see them as making an irreplaceable and indispensable contribution to their 
intimate relationship with God. 
The neglected alternative is that, whatever gains may come about in 
the wake of  suffering, its presence in the world involves a net loss. In other 
words, our present world is a tragic world. The distinctive goods that could 
only be realized in the wake of  suffering do not, in the final analysis, lead 
to its “defeat” in the way that some have argued. Instead, the world would 
have been better, all things considered, had suffering never come about. To 
some, this will seem to limit or detract from the power of  God to overcome 
suffering and/or to underestimate, if  not undermine, the good things that 
can be achieved in response to it. But elevating the potential benefits that can 
come about through suffering—or if  not exactly through suffering, through 
creative responses to suffering—seems to minimize the negativity of  the 
experience and turn it into something ultimately beneficial. 
Whatever her response to such concerns might be, there is no doubt 
that Stump’s remarkable achievement will attract admiration and stimulate 
discussion for years to come.
Loma Linda University                 richard ricE
Ulrich, Eugene. The Biblical Qumran Scrolls: Transcriptions and Textual Variants, 
vols. 1-3. Leiden: Brill, 2013. xvi + 796 pp. Paper, $99.
It was in the extremely sensitive political situation of  post-WWII Palestine, 
right before the outbreak of  the 1948 war, that the first manuscripts were 
discovered close to Qumran near the Dead Sea and Jericho. The Bedouin 
Muhammed edh-Dhib was the first to accidentally find the first three scrolls, 
